Lead Attorney Louis M. Pissios

Unveiling the Elements of an Aggressive Legal Defense to Criminal Charges

Unveiling the Elements of an Aggressive Legal Defense to Criminal Charges

Introduction

When facing criminal charges, the stakes are high, and the consequences can be life-altering. In such dire circumstances, mounting an aggressive legal defense is crucial to protect one’s rights and ensure a fair trial. An aggressive defense strategy employs various legal tactics to challenge the prosecution’s case, uncover weaknesses in evidence, and safeguard the accused’s interests. In this article, we will explore the elements of an aggressive legal defense to criminal charges and how they can make a significant difference in the outcome of a case.

  1. Thorough Investigation

The foundation of any robust defense starts with a thorough investigation of the case. An experienced defense attorney will scrutinize the evidence, police reports, witness statements, and any other relevant information to identify potential flaws in the prosecution’s case. This investigation aims to uncover inconsistencies, procedural errors, or any violations of the accused’s rights that can be used to challenge the credibility of the evidence presented against them.

  1. Challenge the Constitutionality of Evidence Gathering

An aggressive defense will scrutinize the methods used by law enforcement to collect evidence. If there is any indication of illegal searches, seizures, or violations of the accused’s constitutional rights (such as Miranda rights), the defense can file motions to suppress such evidence. When crucial evidence is suppressed, it can significantly weaken the prosecution’s case or, in some instances, lead to the dismissal of charges altogether.

  1. Attack Witness Credibility

Witness testimony plays a vital role in criminal trials. An aggressive defense will delve into the backgrounds and motivations of key witnesses to challenge their credibility. This can involve exposing biases, inconsistencies in their statements, or prior criminal records that may impact their reliability. Discrediting prosecution witnesses can create reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors and weaken the prosecution’s case.

  1. Establish Alibi or Alternative Explanations

Presenting a compelling alibi or alternative explanation for the events in question is another crucial element of an aggressive defense. This may involve gathering evidence, such as surveillance footage, witness statements, or electronic data, to support the accused’s version of events and refute the prosecution’s narrative.

  1. Expert Testimony

In some cases, the defense may enlist the help of expert witnesses to challenge the prosecution’s scientific or technical evidence. Whether it’s DNA analysis, ballistics, or forensic accounting, expert testimony can provide an objective assessment of the evidence and raise doubts about its accuracy or relevance.

  1. Suppressing Prejudicial Information

An aggressive defense will seek to prevent the prosecution from introducing prejudicial information or evidence that is irrelevant to the case. This may involve motions to exclude certain evidence that could unfairly sway the jury’s opinion against the accused.

  1. Jury Selection

The selection of a fair and impartial jury is crucial to the outcome of a trial. An aggressive defense will strategically engage in voir dire, the process of questioning potential jurors, to identify biases or prejudices that could adversely affect the accused’s case.

  1. Negotiating Plea Bargains

While an aggressive defense seeks acquittal, it’s also important to explore all available options. Skillful negotiation with the prosecution may lead to reduced charges or lighter sentencing through a plea bargain. However, a strong defense ensures that any plea agreement is in the best interest of the accused.

Conclusion

When facing criminal charges, an aggressive legal defense can be the difference between conviction and acquittal. By employing the elements discussed in this article, a defense attorney can mount a robust case that challenges the prosecution’s evidence, witnesses, and the constitutionality of the proceedings. Remember, every case is unique, and it is essential to consult with a qualified attorney to determine the most effective defense strategy based on the specific circumstances of the case.

unusual Traffic and vehicle offenses in illinois

In Illinois, some unusual traffic and vehicle offenses include:

  • Leaving the scene of an accident: It is a crime to flee the scene of an accident in which someone is injured or killed, or in which there is significant property damage.
  • Reckless driving: This is a criminal offense in Illinois, and can include behaviors such as excessive speeding, weaving in and out of traffic, or tailgating.
  • Aggravated reckless driving: This is a more severe form of reckless driving and can result from behaviors such as racing on a highway or causing bodily harm to another person while driving recklessly.
  • Driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol (DUI): Illinois law prohibits operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and penalties can include fines, jail time, and license suspension or revocation.
  • Operating an uninsured vehicle: It is illegal to drive a vehicle on Illinois roads without valid insurance. Penalties may include fines, license suspension or revocation, and community service.
  • Transporting open alcohol: It is illegal to have open containers of alcohol in a vehicle while it is being operated.

Please keep in mind that this is not an exhaustive list and you should always check the Illinois’s Vehicle Code for the most up-to-date information.

Louis M. Pissios
Attorneys and Counselors at Law
a professional corporation
9 South County Street
across the street from the courthouse
Waukegan, Illinois 60085
direct email: [email protected]

Direct Telephone 847.263.0001

200 new Illinois laws scheduled to take effect on Jan. 1. Here are the new laws governing Crime, Courts, Corrections and Law Enforcemen

More than 200 new Illinois laws scheduled to take effect on Jan. 1. Here are the new laws governing Crime, Courts, Corrections and Law Enforcement in Lake County, Illinois:

  • Child Abuse by Professionals (SB 1763/PA 99-0350): Clarifies definitions to include situations where a person who is acting in a professional capacity abuses or neglects a child.
  • Abused Adult Records Access (SB 1309/PA 99-0287): Gives a Public Guardian access to records regarding investigations of abuse, neglect, financial exploitation or self-neglect of eligible adults when the Public Guardian is investigating the need for a guardianship or pursuing a petition for guardianship.
  • Abused Children Protection Orders (SB 1335/PA 99-0349): Provides that the parties to the proceedings are also entitled to copies of unfounded reports.
  • AED Mandate (SB 764/PA 99-0246): Requires sheriff’s offices and municipal police departments that employ over 100 police officers comply with the AED Act and be equipped with an AED.
  • Body Cameras (SB 1304/PA 99-0352): Establishes rules and regulations for the use of officer-worn body cameras and implements a package of police reforms. Police reforms: Prohibits police from using chokeholds, except when deadly force is justified; requires an independent review of officer-involved deaths, and makes investigation reports part of the public record if an officer involved in a death is not charged with a crime; expands police officer training to include topics like use of force; creates a database of officers who have been fired or resigned due to misconduct. Body camera regulations: Does not require police departments to use body cameras. If they choose to do so, officers must keep their cameras on when conducting law enforcement activities. Officers would be allowed to turn the camera off when talking to a confidential informant, or at the request of a victim or witness. Requires officers to let people know they are recording if they enter a home. Videos will be kept for 90 days, unless flagged for specific reasons. Allows for grants via a $5 fee increase for each $40 on criminal and traffic offenses, to go toward cameras and new training.
  • Coroner Training Board (SB 663/PA 99-0408): Creates the Coroner Training Board Act and Transfers the oversight of coroner training from the Law Enforcement Training Standards Board to a new Coroner Training Board the authority to conduct and approve a training program in death investigations.
  • County Jail “Good Time” Sentencing (HB 3785/PA 99-0259): Changes existing provision that no committed person may be penalized more than 30 days of good behavior allowance for any one infraction by providing that if the infraction is the second or subsequent infraction within any 30-day period, then the committed person may not be penalized more than 60 days of good behavior allowance.
  • Court Interpreters for Civil Cases (HB 3620/PA 99-0133): Requires appointment of language interpreters for witnesses and parties in civil cases, if necessary.
  • Court Services Fee (SB 804/PA 99-0265): Allows counties to impose a higher court services fee (now maximum of $25) if the fee is supported by an acceptable cost study. The fee must be used to defray court security expenses.
  • Court Supervision for Aggravated Speeding (HB 1453/PA 99-0212): Provides that a defendant charged with speeding 26 miles per hour or more in excess of the applicable speed limit may be eligible for court supervision if the defendant has not been previously convicted for a similar offense or previously assigned court supervision for a similar offense.
  • Crime Victims Debt Collection (SB 1866/PA 99-0444): Amends the Crime Victims Compensation Act to prevent a vendor who has been provided notice of a claim filed under the Act from engaging in debt collection activities against the applicant until the Court of Claims awards compensation for the debt and the payment is processed. “Debt collection activities” does not include billing insurance or other government programs, routine inquiries about coverage, or routine billing that indicates that the amount is not due pending resolution of the crime victim compensation claim.
  • Domestic Violence Sentencing Consideration (SB 209/PA 99-0384): Adds a history of domestic violence to the list of mitigating factors for judges to consider during sentencing. Creates a process for courts to review petitions for re-sentencing for certain offenses committed by a victim of domestic violence who was unable to present evidence of domestic violence at trial.
  • Discovery (HB 95/PA 99-0110 – Sen. Michael Connelly): Provides that discovery in civil cases, such as admissions of fact and of genuineness of documents, physical and mental examinations of parties and other persons, the taking of any depositions, and interrogatories shall be in accordance with rules.
  • DUI-related Safety Provisions (SB 627/PA 99-0467): Makes several recommendations based on the Traffic Safety Advisory Committee. Changes include the following:
    • Requires certain individuals suspected of consuming alcohol to sign the written warning from law enforcement.
    • Removes “hard time” provisions which currently prohibit driving relief for DUI offenders, and instead allow offenders to apply for a Monitoring Device Driving Permit or Restricted Driving Permit, with a Breath Alcohol Ignition Interlock Device.
    • Requires any offender with two+ DUI or reckless homicide convictions to install a BAIID as a condition of a Restricted Driving Permit.
    • Requires a BAIID, as a condition of a RDP, if the offender is convicted of DUI involving death, great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement to another.
  • Elderly Exploitation Civil Action (HB 1588/PA 99-0272 – Sen. Jason Barickman): Changes the civil liability provision of financial exploitation of an elderly person or a person with a disability to allow for a civil cause of action regardless of whether criminal charges have been filed. Civil liability provision does not limit or affect the right of a person to bring a cause of action or seek any remedy available under the common law, or other applicable law.
  • Facilitated Courtroom Testimony (SB 1389/PA 99-0094): Allows the court to set conditions it finds just and appropriate, including the use of therapy and service animals, for taking the testimony of a child victim or disabled victim in certain sex offense cases.
  • False 9-1-1 Call (HB 3988/PA 99-0160 – Sen. Michael Connelly): Requires reimbursement where a person makes a false 9-1-1 call knowing there is no reasonable ground for making the call or transmission and further knows that the call or transmission could result in the emergency response of any public safety agency. Caps reimbursement at $10,000.
  • First Responder Assault Penalties (HB 3184/PA 99-0256): Enhances the penalty for aggravated assault of a peace officer, fireman, emergency management worker, or emergency medical technician.
  • Foreclosure Special Representative (SB 735/PA 99-0024): Adds conveyances under a transfer on death instrument, conveyances where title was transferred prior to death, and where title was conveyed from the deceased’s probate estate to foreclosure cases where the court is not required to appoint a special representative for a deceased mortgagor.
  • Foreign Affairs Officers Arrests (HB 1337/PA 99-0190): Provides that the new consular notification mandate does not create any affirmative duty to investigate whether an arrestee or detainee is a foreign national.
  • Gender Identity Protection (HB 3552/PA 99-0417): Provides that the written directions a person leaves regarding disposition of that person’s remains may include instructions regarding gender identity including, but not limited to, instructions with respect to appearance, chosen name, and gender pronouns, regardless of whether the person has obtained a court-ordered name change, changed the gender marker on any identification document, or undergone any transition-related medical treatment.
  • Good Conduct Time Sentencing (HB 3475/PA 99-0381): Amends the Unified Code of Corrections by expanding who may be eligible for certificates of good conduct to include persons convicted of committing or attempting to commit a Class X felony or a forcible felony (other than certain offenses currently specifically excluded in statute).
  • Good Conduct Sentencing Credit (HB 3884/PA 99-0241 – Sen. Michael Connelly): Gives an additional 30 days of sentence credit to any prisoner who passes their high school equivalency testing while in the Department of Corrections or while they are being held in pre-trial detention (county jail) prior to the current commitment to the Department of Corrections.
  • IDOC Parolee Information (HB 2722/PA 99-0275 – Sen. Michael Connelly): Helps protect the privacy of rehabilitated inmates seeking to reenter society because of (1) witness protection issues and gang affiliation/retaliation when an inmate is released. This bill does not affect separate victim notification requirements when an offender is released.
  • Juries – Removal and Disability (HB 3704/PA 99-0102 – Sen. Michael Connelly): Provides additional means of establishing a total and permanent disability for purposes of a prospective juror seeking a permanent exclusion from jury service (an individualized education program plan or proof of a guardianship).
  • Juvenile Justice Councils (HB 3718/PA 99-0258): Eliminates provisions in the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 that require automatic prosecution of minors as adults. Eliminates mandatory and presumptive transfers to adult criminal prosecution. Retains discretionary (judicial) transfer provisions.
  • Juvenile Justice Councils (HB 4044/PA 99-0435): Amends the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 by expanding entities who may designate representatives to serve on county juvenile justice councils. This will add additional community-based perspectives to the juvenile justice councils.
  • Juvenile Justice Reforms (SB 1560/PA 99-0268): Prevents juvenile misdemeanants from Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) commitment, suspends automatic custodianship of DJJ for aftercare (parole) violators if they have new adult criminal charges pending, and adjusts length of aftercare time to be proportional with length of adult parole.
  • Juvenile Justice Reports (HB 3141/PA 99-0255 – Sen. Dale Righter): Amends the Unified Code of Corrections by adding a new section that clarifies the reporting requirements of the Department of Juvenile Justice to the Governor and General Assembly. Provides a due date of Jan. 1.
  • Law Licenses for Non-Citizens (SB 23/PA 99-0419): Asks the Illinois Supreme Court to grant law licenses to non-citizens provided certain conditions have been satisfied related to the recently enacted federal “Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals” program.
  • Lifetime Sentences for Juveniles (HB 2471/PA 99-0069): Aligns Illinois’s criminal statutes with a U.S. Supreme Court ruling that found automatic mandatory life sentences for juveniles to be unconstitutional. Grants judges leeway to determine whether such a sentence is warranted and allows judges to lengthen or shorten a sentence depending on whether a firearm or automatic weapon was used in a capital crime.
  • Minors in Detention Facilities (HB 2567/PA 99-0254): Prohibits a delinquent minor younger than age 13 from being admitted, kept, or detained in a detention facility unless a local youth service provider has first been contacted and is not able to accept the minor.
  • Missing Persons Identification Act Changes (HB 4097/PA 99-0244 – Sen. Kyle McCarter): Prohibits law enforcement agencies from refusing to accept a missing person report on the basis of the missing person’s mental state or medical condition.
  • Mental Health Fitness Ability to Stand Trial (SB 1938/PA 99-0140 – Sen. Tim Bivins): Amends the Code of Criminal Procedure relative to defendants found unfit to stand trial by making sure that the reports of forensic examiners working for circuit courts are also provided to the Department of Human Services (DHS) in conjunction with the judge’s order remanding the unfit defendant to a DHS facility for treatment.
  • Mistaken Arrest Records (HB 169/PA 99-0363): Requires, if a person has been arrested for a criminal offense based upon mistaken identity, the law enforcement agency whose officers made the arrest to delete or retract the arrest records of that person.
  • Orders of Protection Process (HB 3161/PA 99-0240): Prohibits a special process server from being appointed in Cook County if the order of protection to be served grants the surrender of a child, the surrender of a firearm or firearm owner’s identification card, or the exclusive possession of a shared residence.
  • Out-of-State Subpoenas (SB 45/PA 99-0079 – Sen. Jason Barickman): Creates a simple process for civil cases by which a subpoena from an out-of-state court can be used to issue a discovery subpoena in Illinois.
  • Police Crisis Intervention (HB 4112/PA 99-0261): Provides that the Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board (LETSB) will create a standard curriculum in crisis intervention and specialized policing responses to mental illness. Requires LETSB to conduct Crisis Intervention Team Training.
  • Powdered Alcohol Ban (SB 67/PA 99-0051): Prohibits the sale of products consisting of or containing powdered alcohol in Illinois by creating a Class A misdemeanor for a violation and a Class 4 felony for a second or subsequent violations.
  • Powdered Caffeine Prohibition (SB 9/PA 99-0050): Prohibits the sale or offering of powdered pure caffeine to anyone younger than age 18.
  • Power of Attorney (SB 159/PA 99-0328): Makes technical changes to the Illinois Power of Attorney Act relative to health-care powers of attorney.
  • Preservation and Delivery of Evidence (HB 233/PA 99-0354 – Sen. Tim Bivins): Requires the County Coroner to properly preserve evidence from a death investigation if appropriate equipment is available and release it to the investigating agency no later than 30 days after collection. Requires the police agency receiving that evidence to submit the specimens to a National DNA Index System participating laboratory within the state.
  • Probate Citations Recover (SB 1308/PA 99-0093): Allows the court to issue a citation, pursuant to any civil cause of action, for the appearance of any person who may have had assets in his or her possession and of any person who may be liable to the estate of a ward.
  • Probate Disabled Persons Wills (SB 90/PA 99-0302): Establishes a rebuttable presumption that a will or codicil is void if it was executed or modified after the testator is adjudicated disabled and either a plenary or limited guardian has been appointed and the court has found that the testator lacks testamentary capacity.
  • Probate Temp Adult Guardians (HB 2505/PA 99-0070): Amends the Probate Act to provide that a temporary guardian of a disabled adult shall have the limited powers and duties of a guardian of the person or of the estate which are specifically enumerated by court order.
  • Prostitution (SB 201/PA 99-0347): Makes it an aggravating factor in promoting juvenile prostitution, patronizing a prostitute, or patronizing a minor engaged in prostitution knowing that the minor was in the custody or guardianship of the Department of Children and Family Services.
  • Same Sex Hate Crimes Definition (HB 3930/PA 99-0077): Changes definition of “sexual orientation” in the hate crime statute, the institutional vandalism statute, and the statute concerning aggravating factors in sentencing to the definition used in the Illinois Human Rights Act. Amends the offense of institutional vandalism by replacing the term “sexual orientation” with “ancestry, gender, sexual orientation” and “physical or mental disability.”
  • Scott’s Law Changes (SB 1424/PA 99-0125): Adds recycling vehicles to vehicles covered under Scott’s Law.
  • Sealing of Criminal Records (HB 3149/PA 99-0378): Allows a person who earned a high school diploma, associate’s degree, vocational technical certification, or bachelor’s degree, or GED during the period of his or her sentence or mandatory supervised release to petition for early sealing of the record prior to the applicable waiting period.
  • Sealing of Criminal Records (SB 844/PA 99-0385): Allows for sealing of certain eligible criminal records in two years (rather than three years or four years) and other records including eligible felonies in three years (rather than four years) after the end of the case.
  • Sexual Abuse (SB 207/PA 99-0283): Makes it an aggravating factor in sentencing for certain sex offenses committed against a victim with an intellectual disability and the defendant holds a position of trust, authority or supervision in relation to the victim.
  • Statute of Limitations Suspensions for Sexual Assault Evidence Kits (HB 369/PA 99-0252): Tolls the statute of limitation period for charging a sex crime from the time evidence of a sexual assault is collected and submitted by a law enforcement agency until the completion of the analysis of the Illinois State Police.
  • Synthetic Drug Classification (SB 1129/PA 99-0371 – Sen. Kyle McCarter): Gives law enforcement a new tool in combating the sale, distribution and possession of synthetic drugs by banning their underlying chemical structure.

reckless homicide and aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol

A Mundelein woman has pleaded not guilty to reckless homicide and aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol in a fatal crash last year in Libertyville.

Officials said Amanda Auld was driving a vehicle that crashed on Harris Road in Libertyville on March 7, 2015. A passenger in the vehicle was killed in the crash.

Auld, who was not indicted until this year, was arraigned on the charges Thursday before Judge Christopher Stride.

Strike said, if convicted, Auld faces a mandatory prison sentence of three to 14 years unless a judge determines there are extraordinary circumstances that warrant probation.

Utah trooper accused of making false DUI arrests The officer, once praised for her knack for finding drunk drivers, is out of a job and facing lawsuits

 

SALT LAKE CITY — During her 10 years as a Utah state trooper, Lisa Steed built a reputation as an officer with a knack for nabbing drunken motorists in a state with a long tradition of teetotaling and some of the nation’s strictest liquor laws.

Steed used the uncanny talent — as one supervisor once described it — to garner hundreds of arrests, setting records, earning praise as a rising star and becoming the first woman to become trooper of the year.

Today, however, Steed is out of work, fired from the Utah Highway Patrol, and she — and her former superiors — are facing a lawsuit in which some of those she arrested allege she filed bogus DUI reports.

“If we don’t stand up to Lisa Steed or law enforcement, they just pull people over for whatever reason they want,” said attorney Michael Studebaker.

Steed declined to comment, but her attorney Greg Skordas said she denies the allegations. She is trying to get her job back.

The people snared by Steed say the arrests disrupted their lives and were costly to resolve.

Michael Choate, a now-retired aircraft logistics specialist at Hill Air Force Base, said he nearly lost his security clearance and job.

Steed stopped him because he was wearing a Halloween costume and booked him even though three breathalyzers tests showed no alcohol in his system. Choate said he spent $3,800 and had to take four days off of work to get his DUI charged dismissed.

The 49-page lawsuit includes two defendants, but Studebaker said dozens of others are lined up and willing to tell their stories. He said they are requesting the lawsuit be broadened into a class action lawsuit.

Every one of her DUI stops back to at least 2006 should be under suspicion, he said, adding that could be as many as 1,500 people.

The lawsuit, filed in December, also accuses the Utah Highway Patrol of ignoring Steed’s patterns of higher-than-normal DUI bookings and waited too long to take her off patrol. The agency declined to comment.

Steed joined the agency in 2002, and during her first five years, she earned a reputation as a hard-worker whose efficiency led to high arrest totals. By the time she ascended to trooper of the year in 2007, she was held up as one of the agency’s top stars.

In 2009, Steed became a member of the DUI squad. Her 400 DUI arrests that year were thought to be a state record, and more than double the number made by any other highway trooper. She earned special recognition at the state Capitol.

“With her training and experience, it’s second nature for her to find these people who are driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol,” her DUI squad boss at the time, Lt. Steve Winward, told the Deseret News.

During a ride-along with the newspaper, Steed said it was simply a “numbers game,” noting that one in every 10 drivers stopped for a violation is driving impaired. “It’s a lot of hard work, but you make a ton of stops, and you’re going to run into them,” she said.

Steed’s career, however, turned. In 2012, while on the stand in a DUI court case, Steed acknowledged purposely leaving her microphone in her patrol car so that superiors wouldn’t know she was violating agency policy.

By April 2012, her credibility had come into question so much that a prosecutor said he would no longer prosecute DUIs if Steed’s testimony was the only evidence.

In October, the Salt Lake Tribune obtained a memo written in May 2010 in which Utah Highway Patrol Sgt. Rob Nixon flagged Steed’s “pattern” of questionable DUI arrests. He wrote that the bulk of Steed’s arrestees had no signs of “impairing drugs” in their systems.

The memo said she based most of her arrests on signs of impairment such as dilated pupils and leg and body tremors.

Steed was taken off road patrol in April 2012 and fired in November. She was accused of violating department policies, falsifying police reports and using questionable practices when making DUI arrests.

The lawsuit is based on two defendants: Thomas Romero and Julie Tapia.

Romero was stopped after Steed said he was swerving, according to the lawsuit. After Romero said he wasn’t drinking, Steed gave him a roadside sobriety test anyway. She booked him for DUI even though his blood alcohol content was 0.00. Charges were dismissed.

Tapia went to pick up her ex-husband, who had been drinking. Steed approached Tapia as she got out of her car at her house, saying Tapia had been speeding, the lawsuit said. Steed said she could smell alcohol, and Tapia told her it was coming from her ex-husband.

Tapia was arrested for a DUI; her ex-husband for public intoxication. Tapia’s blood test showed no alcohol. Charges were dropped.

Choate, who hopes to join the lawsuit, said the entire agency should be held responsible for the damage Steed caused to him and others. “They let her get away with it for a long time,” he said.

Cop Jailed For Falsely Arresting People For DUI

If you’ve had no alcohol to drink, and you get pulled over by a police officer, you have nothing to fear, right? They can only arrest you if your blood alcohol level is above the state-mandated threshold. And they can only test you if they have your consent or if they have probable cause to do so. If only that were the way things were. Sure, there are laws that are supposed to restrain the government, but these days, those laws are irrelevant. Law enforcement has less to do with enforcing law and more to do with raising revenue and meeting monthly arrest and ticket quotas.

So, even if you had nothing to drink, the officer can still claim that you were “failing to maintain lanes” and use that as probable cause to “suspect” you of DUI, falsely claim on the police report he smelled alcohol on your breath and arrest you on DUI charges.

Even if you’re completely innocent, anything you say will be used against you. They will find a way to twist your words to make it sound like you’re a criminal. This is why so many claim that it’s best just not to say a word to the police. The problem is if you don’t say anything to them, they might arrest you for “obstructing a law enforcement officer.” It seems the best thing to do is to just accept that we live in a tyranny and comply whenever possible so as to stay out of jail. If you choose to “exercise your rights,” expect to wind up in jail. That’s just the culture in which we live.

However, every now and then police officers bark up the wrong tree. And in those cases, as in the recent case of Florida Highway Patrol Trooper Scott Kunstmann, they even end up in jail themselves for doing what was described above—falsifying arrest records and lying during deposition. A local Florida news station reported on one such incident involving Kunstmann and a 71-year-old driver named Culbertson:

“Culbertson was allegedly weaving, so Kunstmann asked a series of questions to determine if a field sobriety test was warranted, and asked another trooper for assistance. Culbertson admitted to having one beer three hours prior. In the police report, Kunstmann indicated he smelled alcohol on Culbertson’s breath, but in the dash cam video, the two officers are heard on tape agreeing that they couldn’t smell alcohol. Kunstmann arrested Culbertson anyway, but didn’t realize at the time he was a former criminology professor, who would later contact an attorney.”

Thanks to his background and connections, Culbertson was able to secure an attorney and get the arresting officer arrested and thrown in jail himself. That wasn’t the first time Kunstmann had lied on his police report to justify an arrest. In another case, he had performed a field sobriety test on a woman who he then arrested for DUI. In his police report, he claimed that she was “belligerent and cussing” during the test. But when you watch the dash cam video, you find that not only was the woman perfectly compliant, she was completely sober, but he arrested her anyway.

So how many others have been falsely arrested for DUI who didn’t have the experience and connections that Culbertson had? No judge is going to question the police report. In a courtroom, it’s considered Gospel. Which is why officers feel at liberty to lie and embellish their reports. If you try to make your case that the police officer lied, the judge and the prosecutor will just claim that you’re mad because you got arrested. Even if you have an attorney, your best hope is often just to stay out of jail or pay a lower fine. Don’t bother trying to fight the cop; he’s immune. Kunstmann’s case is a rare glimpse of justice

Secret police? Virginia considers bill to withhold all officers’ names.

Secret police? Virginia considers bill to withhold all officers’ names.

Virginia debates whether to make names of officers private

Virginia’s House is considering a bill that would make all names of police officers and fire marshals “personnel records,” exempting them from mandatory disclosure under the state’s freedom of information law. (Ashleigh Joplin/The Washington Post)

It started with a reporter’s attempt to learn whether problem police officers were moving from department to department. It resulted in legislation that is again bringing national scrutiny to the Virginia General Assembly: a bill that could keep all Virginia police officers’ names secret.

In a climate where the actions of police nationwide are being watched as never before, supporters say the bill is needed to keep officers safe from people who may harass or harm them. But the effort has drawn the attention of civil rights groups and others who say police should be moving toward more transparency — not less — to ensure that troubled officers are found and removed.

If it is made law, experts say the restriction would be unprecedented nationwide.

The Virginia Senate has already approved Senate Bill 552, which would classify the names of all police officers and fire marshals as “personnel records,” exempting them from mandatory disclosure under the state’s freedom of information law. The Republican-dominated Virginia House will consider the bill in hearings starting Thursday. Gov. Terry McAuliffe (D) has not taken a position on the bill yet, his spokesman said.

State Sen. John A. Cosgrove Jr. (R-Chesapeake) — citing that he knew many police officers and their families — said: “The culture is not one of respect for law enforcement anymore. It’s really, ‘How, how can we get these guys? What can we do?’ . . . Police officers are much more in jeopardy. There’s no nefarious intent behind the bill.”

Pushback has been strong. “To say every officer’s name ought to be confidential,” said Claire Gastañaga, executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union of Virginia, “is just a step too far in government secrecy. We are dangerously close to a police state in some respects.” She said shootings and attacks on police are rarely committed by anyone using public records.

Although other states have made moves to shield the identities of some officers, none would go as far as the proposal in Virginia.

In Oregon, the state House passed a bill last week allowing the name of an officer involved in a police shooting to be withheld for 90 days if a judge finds there is a credible threat to the officer. This followed the killing of a protester from the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge, held by armed occupiers for more than a month this year. And the Pennsylvania House passed a bill in November mandating the withholding the name of an officer involved in a shooting while the investigation is pending — which would be a change from the Philadelphia Police Department’s policy of releasing the name within three days.

Kevin Carroll, president of the Virginia Fraternal Order of Police union, said he knew of one instance when a citizen had taken an officer’s name and committed financial fraud, adding that the potential existed in other cases for danger to an officer’s family. “This is not about trying to keep information from the public, to have secret police,” Carroll said.”But it is about wanting to keep our officers safe.”

Carroll said: “With the current trend across the country, law enforcement officers have been attacked and even assassinated because of issues being driven in the media. . . . With technology now, if you have a name, you could find out where they live. It puts them at risk.”

Completely withholding officers’ names from the public is a new step nationally, according to Dan Bevarly, interim executive director of the National Freedom of Information Council. “Usually legislation is related to a specific incident, but not as a preventive measure,” he said. “To do such a blanket exemption for a high-profile government employee, what are you trying to accomplish?”

John Worrall, a criminology professor at the University of Texas at Dallas specializing in policing in legal issues, said that in his review of state freedom of information laws, “none that I’ve found have gone to this extreme. In fact, the opposite is occurring” in many states, Worrall said, with more governments and police agencies posting information promptly about police-involved shootings.

Although police supporters fear the use of publicly available records against them, “that’s largely based on a total lack of data,” Worrall said. “There’s no data on retaliatory actions against police officers. And even if the problem exists, I’m not convinced that hiding their names is the solution.”

Worrall and others noted that keeping officers’ names secret seems to conflict with the idea of community policing and building trust with citizens. “I don’t know how you have community policing,” Gastañaga said, “when nobody knows your name.”

Should the Virginia bill become law, the practical implications still aren’t clear. Some worry it would allow an officer who pulls over a driver, or stops someone in the street, to refuse to provide his or her name. Officers’ names would still appear on traffic tickets or court documents.

Police would still have the discretion to release any officer’s name if they wanted, and police officials said they would not withhold names without specific reasons. Fairfax County Police Chief Edwin C. Roessler Jr. said he and the Fairfax County Board of Supervisors remains “committed to increasing our transparency.” He said that officers would never be removing their names from their uniforms, as some have suggested the bill would allow, and that he would withhold a name only to protect a particular officer’s safety or the sanctity of an ongoing investigation. Fairfax police waited 16 months to release the name of the officer who shot an unarmed Springfield man, John Geer, in 2013. The release came only after a judge ordered it.

Dana Schrad, executive director of the Virginia Association of Chiefs of Police, said police in the commonwealth already have the option to withhold names, and Cosgrove’s bill merely codifies that discretion. She and Carroll, the police union president, both noted that 1,500 Virginia state employees had fraudulent tax returns filed last year, which officials think originated with an online database of employee names and salaries.

“We do not expect this to be abused,” said Schrad, who sent an email to state police chiefs saying: “We caution all of our agencies to use discretion in exercising this exemption. In order to build a trust relationship with communities, agencies should make sure that the communities know who their officers are. This exemption should only be exercised when trying to protect the identity of an undercover officer or when protecting the integrity” of an internal affiars investigation.

Schrad and Carroll helped launch the bill after the Virginian-Pilot newspaper and the state Department of Criminal Justice Services reached an agreement last summer for the state to release the names, agencies and dates of employment of every law enforcement officer in Virginia. Schrad opposed the release because she said the database was old and inaccurate, saying that providing the mass data was her chief reason for pursuing the bill.

Virginian-Pilot reporter Gary Harki said he wanted to check tips he had received that officers who were fired from one department were simply rejoining a police force elsewhere, similar to the reporting done by the Boston Globe on reassignment of pedophilic Catholic priests in Massachusetts. The newspaper negotiated an agreement with the state to obtain the names of only current officers, not to publish the entire database or share it with anyone, and to indemnify the state from any legal claims.

After the agreement was signed, Schrad and Carroll objected, and the state changed its mind. No deal. But the state failed to cite a legal exemption for its refusal in the required time under the state Freedom of Information Act, and a Norfolk judge ruled that the data had to be given to Harki. The judge also ruled that police names are personnel records that can be exempt under FOIA, but he said the state had already agreed to release them. The ruling at the circuit-court level does not have the weight of legal precedent and so Schrad and Carroll sought to put it into law.

“The public has a right to know who their police officers are,” Harki said. “To me, it’s just a fundamental principle of democracy [to know] who our public officials are.” He said that the database he got was “just a piece of a larger puzzle to a problem that may or may not exist” and that he hasn’t published anything about it since the Virginian-Pilot won the court ruling in November.

When Harki worked as a reporter in West Virginia, a similar investigation of troubled officers moving between departments resulted in legislation adding oversight to the movement of officers.

Megan Rhyne of the Virginia Coalition for Open Government noted that many public servants take actions that could anger citizens — prosecutors, social service workers, judges — but their names remain public. She also said that withholding names would result in a lack of accountability for a variety of unsavory acts, such as profligate spending or hiring friends and family, actions that often are caught only when names are linked to illegal deeds.

The bill is scheduled for a hearing Thursday afternoon before a subcommittee of the House General Laws Committee, chaired by Del. James M. LeMunyon (R-Fairfax). He declined to offer his views on the bill, but he said if it passed, it would be heard again next Thursday before the entire committee, then possibly sent to the full House.

Illinois DUI Case List

Illinois DUI Case List Expert Witnesses People v. Jones, 2015 IL App (1st) 121016 (04/22/2015) (“foundational element” used to strike a state firearms expert witness) People v. Safford, 392 Ill. App. 3d 212, 221 (2009) (court said that the admission of an expert’s testimony requires an adequate reliability foundation) People v. McKown, 236 Ill.2d 278 (2010) (HGN foundations case but see King below) People v. Floyd, 2014 IL App (2d) 120507 (March 2014) (retrograde extrapolation based on a single breath test is more speculation than science) Soto v. Gaytan, 313 Ill. App. 3d 137 (2000) (another case that talks about a foundational element) People v. Negron, 2012 IL App (1st) 101194 (2012) (another case that allows a fingerprint expert to testify but discusses Safford’s foundations test) Discovery Sanctions People v. Tsiamas, 2015 IL App (2d) 140859 (December 2015) (State can’t ignore discovery notice) People v. Moravec, 2015 IL App (1st) 133869 (November 2015) (DUI sanctions UPHELD) People v. Kladis, 2011 IL 110920 (DUI evidence suppressed after video is destroyed) People v. Aronson, 408 Ill.App.3d 946 (2011) (failure to make a copy is a sanctionable) People v. Strobel, 2014 IL App (1st) 130300 (June 2014) (no discovery violation occurred here so it was error to impose a discovery sanction) People v. Olsen, 2015 IL App (2d) 140267 (June 2015) (error for the trial judge to suppress evidence due to a purported discovery violation) People v. Moises, 2015 IL App (3d) 140577 (August 2015) (trial court’s decision to grant a discovery sanction is reversed because there was no discovery violation when officer did not record the FST) Probable Cause Navarette v. California, 134 S.Ct. 1683 (2014) (anonymous 911 call justifies traffic stop) People v. Anderson, 2013 IL App (2d) 121346 (October 2014) People v. Butorac, 2013 IL App (2d) 110953 (December 2014) (officers may board a boat to enforce registration requirements) People v. Cummings, 2014 IL 115769 (March 2014) People v. Gonzalez­Carrera, 2014 IL App (2d) 130968 (September 2014) People v. Timmsen, 2014 IL App (3d) 120481 (July 2014) (it’s ok to avoid a traffic roadblock so long as you don’t break any other traffic laws) People v. Santovi, 2014 IL App 2014 IL App (3d) 130075 (May 2014) (no pc to arrest defendant before cop yells at the women and orders her to open the bathroom door or he’ll kick it down) People v. Taiwo, 2015 IL App (3d) 140105 (April 2015) (proper to stop a car for a lane infraction when the cop had a hunch the car was connected to an accident he was investigating) Rescissions & Suspended DLs People v. Elliott, 2014 IL 115308 (January 2014) (recession only acts prospectively and has no retroactive effect, thus rescinding a suspension will not undue convictions based on that suspension) People v. Smith, 2013 IL App (2d) 121164 (November 2013) (DWLS can’t be revoked) People v. Clayton, 2014 IL App (4th) 130340 (March 2014) (even if notice was tampered with by the cop defendant had actual notice of his pending suspension) People v. Gaede, 2014 IL App (4th) 130346 (November 2014) (defendant withdrew his consent and implied consent statute found constitutional) People v. Morales, 2015 IL App (1st) 131207 (January 2015) (suspension reinstated defendant received proper notice from the police on the day of his arrest and had more than ample opportunity to challenge the suspension in court) People v. McLeer, 2015 IL App (2d) 140526 (February 2015) (officer amends the report after it was issued, suspension stands because SOS had enough information that the notice was given) People v. Gutierrez, 2015 IL App (3d) 140194 (July 2015) (A PBT test is not a statement, thus, the officer’s DL suspension is proper) Blood & BAC People v. Wuckert, 2015 IL App (2d) 150058 (December 2015) (625 ILCS 5/111­501.4 trumps hospital policy that the results should not be used for legal purposes) People v. Armer, 2014 IL App (5th) 130342 (October 2014) (warrantless blood draw suppressed when not done with consent nor under exigent circumstances) People v. Harris, 2015 IL App (4th) 140696 (May 2015) (consensual blood draws ok) People v. Weidner, 2014 IL App (5th) 130022 (March 2014) (no error to wipe defendant’s arm with an alcohol wipe before hospital took his blood) People v. Hutchinson, 2013 IL App (1st) 1023332 (November 2013) (no error in admitting report of lab results as a business record) People v. Harris, 2014 IL App (2d) 120990 (May 2014) (state had problems showing the breathalyzer was certified) People v. Eagletail, 2014 IL App (1st) 130252 (December 2014) (logbook and printout admissible even though printout was made years after the breath test) People v. Chiaravalle, 2014 IL App (4th) 140445 (December 2014) (officer made a continuous observation even though he may have had his back to the defendant from time to time) People v. Thomas, 2014 IL App (2d) 130660 (May 2014) (speedy trial violated when police waited to issue BAC citation they already knew what the hospital blood BAC was) People v. Torruella, 2015 IL App (2d) 141001 (August 2015) (no error here when the trial judge accepted calibration records of the breathalyzer as a business record and no error when the court disregarded the defense expert’s testimony) People v. Smith, 2015 IL App (1st) 122306 (August 2015) (state failed to establish that the machine was properly certified within the 62 day window required by the regulations) Evidence People v. Blakey, 2015 IL App (3d) 130719 (November 2015) (prior inconsistent statement in this DUI huffing case was admitted in error) People v. Phillips, 2015 IL App (1st) 131147 (October 2015) (defendant blew under .08 and attacked that the officer’s opinion he was intoxicated) People v. Way, 2015 IL App (5th) 130096 (September 2015) (proximate cause defense, error to deny the defendant a chance to defend her aggravated DUI by arguing that the cannabis in her system did not contribute to the accident) People v. King, 2014 IL App (2d) 130461 (November 2014) (officer can testify to how defendant acted during instructions of HGN even though the results themselves not admitted) People v. O’Donnell, 2015 IL App (4th) 130358 (March 2015) (officer committed error when she testified it was her belief that Defendant was lying to her at the scene of the one car accident and that he was showing deception People v. Kathan, 2014 IL App (2d) 121335 (August 2014) (a drug driving case with an admission, bad driving and impairment leads to guilt) People v. Morris, 2014 IL App (1st) 130512 (July 2014) (actual physical control established when defendant passed out in front seat of parked car, the ignition off, the driver’s side door open, and keys in his right hand) Sentence People v. Lake, 2015 IL App (3d) 140031 (April 2015) (9 year sentence for aggravated DUI Death conviction upheld; it was not excessive; defendant was racing a horse) People v. Rennie, 2014 IL App (3d) 130014 (May 2014) (16 year olds 6 year sentence for aggravated DUI upheld she had weed in her system when motorcyclist died in an accident) People v. Stutzman, 2015 IL App (4th) 130889 (August 2015) (defendant inappropriately plead guilty to reckless homicide and aggravated DUI in violation of one act one crime principles) People v. Mischke, 2014 IL App (2d) 130318 (December 2014) (enhancement to a Class 2 felony occurs whenever a defendant has two prior convictions for any form of DUI, not just aggravated DUIs)

’Reasonable Suspicion’ enough for traffic stop

Supreme court: ’reasonable suspicion’ enough for traffic stop

“Reasonable suspicion,” not the more exacting “probable cause,” is threshold requirement for an investigatory traffic stop, the Illinois Supreme Court held in a recent DUI ruling.

In overturning a trial court’s order to suppress evidence in a Will County DUI case, the Illinois Supreme Court determined that a traffic stop was proper when the arresting officer witnessed the driver making slight deviations from his lane of traffic.

The trial court had granted the defendant’s motion to suppress based on arguments that the evidence of his insobriety and suspended license was the “fruit of an unlawful search,” and a divided appellate court affirmed that ruling. According to the high court’s opinion, the defendant argued that the officer lacked “probable cause” and therefore had no proper grounds to make the traffic stop.

In People v. Hackett, 2012 IL 111781, a unanimous supreme court overturned the appellate and trial court decisions and remanded the case for a trial based on evidence stemming from what the court held to be a justified “investigatory stop” of defendant’s vehicle. Reasonable suspicion, not probable cause, is the proper standard for an investigatory traffic stop, the high court held.

Assistant Appellate Defender Kerry Bryson said there was obviously some doubt in the minds of the trial judge and appellate panel about what justified pulling over a driver and investigating him and his vehicle.

“To the extent there might have been any question about that, the [supreme] court has made it clear that there shouldn’t be,” said Bryson, who did not handle this case. “To the extent that this is a concern, what clients ought to know moving forward is if they’re going to challenge the stop, the proper standard is…was there reasonable suspicion.”

‘[M]omentary crossings’ can justify stop

In affirming the motion to suppress, the appellate court relied on People v. Smith, 172 Ill.2d 289 (1986), in which a driver was convicted after driving in and out of multiple lanes of traffic for a “reasonably appreciable distance.” The appellate court distinguished Smith from the case at hand, stating that Hackett made only “momentary crossings” of a highway lane line and therefore the officer lacked reasonable grounds to make a stop.

The supreme court rejected the notion that the distance or length of time of the lane deviations made any difference in the enforcement of a statute that prohibits any improper lane usage.

“Although this court in Smith…mentioned the measure of defendant’s deviation into an adjacent lane and the distance he travelled therein, nothing in this court’s analysis indicated either was significant to the outcome,” Justice Karmeier wrote for the court in Hackett.

In this opinion, the supreme court’s analysis focused on “the loose terminology the parties and lower courts in this case have used with reference to the standards applicable to the fourth amendment issue presented for our consideration. The question we agreed to address…is ‘whether the appellate court erroneously found there was no reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop where the uncontested testimony showed defendant swerved twice across a lane divider of traffic.'”

The court explained that vehicle stops are subject to the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonableness requirement,” and the decision to stop a vehicle usually requires probable cause for an officer to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.

“However, as this court has observed, though traffic stops are frequently supported by ‘probable cause’…as differentiated from the ‘less exacting’ standard of ‘reasonable, articulable suspicion’ that justifies an ‘investigative stop,’ the latter will suffice for purposes of the fourth amendment irrespective of whether the stop is supported by probable cause,” the court wrote.

An opening for the defense?

Bryson said the Hackett case got interesting after the third district appellate court affirmed the motion to suppress “because it gave some support to challenging a traffic stop when there was just momentary drifting over the line.” But now it is clear that multiple deviations from a lane of traffic, even if slight in distance and time, are sufficient grounds for an investigative stop, she said.

“I think there’s a little more to it if you read [the Hackett decision] in depth,” Bryson added. “There has to be no reasonable explanation for the deviations” in order for an investigatory stop to be justified.

“If there is a reason for the deviation from the lane, then there might not have been reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the stop,” Bryson said. “In some cases, there’s been no exploration of that aspect of the basis for the stop. I think that leaves this open as for what a defense attorney can be looking for as a way to challenge the stop.”

The supreme court bolstered its decision by pointing out that a police officer “can effect a lawful Terry stop without first ‘considering whether the circumstances he or she observed would satisfy each element of a particular offense.'”

Where, as in Hackett, a police officer observes multiple lane deviations for no apparent reason, an investigatory stop is proper, the court reasoned.

“For probable cause and conviction, there must be something more: affirmative testimony that defendant deviated from his proper lane of travel and that no road conditions necessitated the movement,” said the court. “An investigatory stop in this situation allows the officer to inquire further into the reason for the lane deviation, either by inquiry of the driver or verification of the condition of the roadway where the deviation occurred.”

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